This paper is about the good side of modal logic, the bad side of modal logic, and how hybrid logic takes the good and fixes the bad.
MOD and PROP) the non-logical symbols we need, namely a MOD-indexed collection
of two place relation symbols R π , and a PROP-indexed collection of unary relation symbols P, Q, P , Q , and so on. We then build formulas in the classical language of our choice.
As modal languages and classical languages both talk about relational structures, it seems overwhelmingly likely that a systematic relationship exists between them. And in fact, the modal language (over PROP and MOD) can be translated into the bestknown classical language of all, namely the first-order language (over PROP and MOD) . Here are some clauses of the Standard Translation, a top-down translation which inductively maps modal to first-order formulas:
= ∀y(xR π y → ST y (ϕ)). [14] .
Here x is a fixed but arbitrary free variable. In the fourth and fifth clause, the variable y can be any variable not used so far in the translation. The clauses governing ST y are analogous to those given for ST x ; in particular, the clauses for the modalities introduce a new variable (say z) and so on. For any modal formula ϕ, ST x (ϕ) is a first-order formula containing exactly one free variable (namely x), and it is easy to see that

M, w ϕ iff M |= ST x (ϕ)[w] (where |= denotes the first-order satisfaction relation and [w] means assign the state w to the free variable x in ST x (ϕ)). The equivalence can be proved by induction, but it should be self-evident: the Standard Translation is simply a reformulation of the clauses of the Kripke satisfaction definition. There are also non-trivial links between modal logic and infinitary logic, fixed-point logic, and second-order logic; in particular, modal validity is intrinsically secondorder. For further discussion, see Blackburn, de Rijke, and Venema
In short, modal logic is not some mysterious non-classical intensional logic, and modalities are not strange new devices. On the contrary, modalities are simply macros that handle quantification over accessible states.
This, of course, leads to another question. OK -so we can use modal logic when working with relational structures -but why bother if it's really just a disguised way of doing classical logic? I think the following two answers are the most important: modal logic brings simplicity and perspective.
Simplicity comes in a variety of forms. For a start, modal representations are often clean and compact: modalities pack a useful punch into a readable notation. Moreover, modal logic often brings us back to the realms of the computable: while the first-order logic over MOD and PROP is undecidable (whenever MOD is non-empty), its modal logic is decidable (in fact, PSPACE-complete).
Perspective is more subtle. Modal languages talk about relational structures in a special way: they take an internal and local perspective on relational structure. When we evaluate a modal formula, we place it inside the model, at some particular state w (the current state). The satisfaction clause (and in particular, the clause for the modalities) allow us to scan other states for information -but we're only allowed to scan states reachable from the current state. The reader should think of a modal formula as a little automaton, placed at some point on a graph, whose task is to explore the graph by visiting accessible states. This internal, local, perspective is responsible for many of the attractive mathematical properties of modal logic. Moreover, it makes modal representations ideal for many applications. Here's a classic example: Example 1.6 (Temporal logic) We'll be seeing a lot of the bimodal language with MOD = {F, P} in this paper: the modality F means "at some Future state", and P means "at some Past state". To reflect this temporal interpretation, we usually interpret this language on frames of the form (T, <) that can plausibly be thought of as 'flows of time ' . For example, if we think of time as a branching structure, (T, <) might be some kind of tree, and if we want a linear view of time, (T, <) might be ( , <) (the integers in their usual order). When interpreting the language on such frames we insist that R F is <, and R P is its converse; that is, as required, we ensure that F looks forward along the flow of time, and P backwards.
Consider the formula P Mia-unconscious. [34] take this idea to its ultimate conclusion: abstracting from the work of James Allen [1] , they present a modal logic which allows all possible relationships between two closed intervals over a linear flow of time to be explored 'from the inside'.
Nowadays, few modal logicians regard modal logic as a non-classical logic, and they certainly don't feel tied to any of the traditional interpretations of modal machinery. On the contrary, since the early 1970s modal logic has been explored as a subsystem of various classical logics, and it is now clear that modal logic are a very special part of classical logic. Indeed, modal languages are in many respects so natural, that -as modal logicians love to point out -it's not particularly surprising that they have been independently reinvented by other research communities that make use of relational structures. Let's look at two well known examples. Summing up, modal logic is a well-behaved and intuitively natural fragment of classical logic. Over the past 25 years, modal logicians have explored and extended this fragment in many ways. By introducing modal operators of arbitrary arities, they have made it possible to work with relational structures containing relations of any arity. By evaluating formulas at sequences of states (as is done in multidimensional modal logic; see Marx and Venema [39] ) they have generalized the notion of perspective. By introducing logical modalities (see Goranko and Passy [33] and de Rijke [47] ) they have shown how to introduce certain forms of globality into modal logic while retaining (and in certain respects improving) their desirable properties. Indeed, in recent work on the guarded fragment (see Andréka, van Benthem, and Németi [2] ) they have shown that it is even possible to "export" the locality intuition back to classical logic; this line of work has unearthed several previously unknown decidable fragments of first-order (and other) classical logics. For a detailed account of contemporary modal logic, see Blackburn, De Rijke, and Venema [14] .
So modal logicians have a lot to be proud of. But for all these achievements, something is missing. What exactly?
The Trouble with Modal Logic
Carlos Areces summed it up neatly: there is an asymmetry at the heart of modal logic. Although states are crucial to Kripke semantics, nothing in modal syntax get to grips with them. This leads to (at least) two kinds of problem. For a start, it means that for many applications modal logic is not an adequate representation formalism. Moreover, it makes it difficult to devise usable modal reasoning systems. In short, the asymmetry underlying orthodox modal logic translates into obvious weaknesses as a representation formalism. The same asymmetry leads to problems with reasoning. Until recently, modal proof theory was a relatively neglected topic. Traditionally, modal logicians have been content to formulate modal proof systems as Hilbert-style axiomatizations, this being enough to get on with the topics that interested them with a minimum of syntactic fuss. But it resulted in few usable modal proof systems available, and little in the way of general proof-theoretical results.
An important exception to this was Fitting's [25] groundbreaking work on prefixed tableau systems. Fitting's work can be viewed as a precursor to Gabbay's [26] work on labelled deduction. In essence, Gabbay's proposal is to develop a metalinguistic algebra of labels that can act as the motor for modal deduction. Another recent general approach, display calculus (see Kracht [37] ), though very different from labelled deduction, also makes use of novel metalinguistic machinery. Display calculus is an extension of sequent calculus which introduces additional notation to allow us to freely manipulate object language formulas (in much the same way as a school child rewrites polynomial equations). Now, first-order proof theory does not require this kind of metalinguistic support. This is because first-order languages are expressive enough to support the key deduction steps at the object level. If we find a representation formalism that is not capable of doing this, but needs to be augmented by a rich metatheoretic machinery, this is a signal that something is missing. Modal logic seems to be such a formalism -what exactly does it lack?
If we look at the Fitting-Gabbay tradition, an answer practically leaps off the page: we need to be able to deal with states explicitly. We need to be able to name them, reason about their identity, and reason about the transitions that are possible between them. In essence, labelled deduction in its various forms supplies metalinguistic equipment for carrying out these tasks, and this leads to modally natural proof systems. In particular, labelled deduction successfully captures the key intuition underlying Kripke semantics, that of a little automaton working it's way through a graphlike structure -except that the automaton's deductive task is to try and build such a structure, not explore a pre-existing one.
Summing up, whether we think about representation or reasoning the conclusion is the same: modal logic's lack of mechanisms for dealing with states explicitly is a genuine weakness.
Hybrid Logic
Hybrid languages provide a truly modal solution to this problem. Modal logic may not be perfect -but it's certainly a most remarkable fragment of classical logic. How can we add reference to states without destroying it?
Let's go back to basics. Modal logic allows us to form complex formulas out of atomic formulas using booleans and modalities. There's only formulas, nothing else. So if we want to name states and remain modal, we should find a way of naming states using formulas. We can do this by introducing a second sort of atomic formula: nominals. Syntactically these will be ordinary atomic formulas, but they will have an important semantic property: nominals will be true at exactly one point in any model; nominals 'name' this point by being true there and nowhere else. Let's make this idea precise -and improve it in one respect, by adding satisfaction operators. 
For any nominal i, we shall call the symbol sequence @ i a satisfaction operator.
Remark 3.2 (Nominals and satisfaction operators) As promised, nominals are formulas. What are satisfaction operators? In essence, a simple way of further exploiting the presence of nominals: @ i ϕ means "go to the point named by i (that is, the unique point where i is true) and see if ϕ is true there". That is, @ i ϕ is a way of asserting -in the object language -that ϕ is satisfied at a particular point. Formulas of the form @ i ϕ and ¬@ i ϕ are called satisfaction statements.
Definition 3.3 (Hybrid models, satisfaction, and validity) A hybrid model is a triple
(W, {R π | π ∈ MOD}, V ) where (W, {R π | π ∈ MOD})
is a frame and V is a hybrid valuation. A hybrid valuation is a function with domain PROP∪NOM and range Pow (W ) such that for all nominals i, V (i) is a singleton subset of W . We call the unique state in V (i) the denotation of i. We interpret hybrid languages on hybrid models by adding the following two clauses to the Kripke satisfaction definition:
M, w i iff w ∈ V (i), where i ∈ NOM M, w @ i ϕ iff M, w ϕ, where w is the denotation of i.
If ϕ is satisfied at all states in all hybrid models based on a frame F , then we say that ϕ is valid on F and write F ϕ. If ϕ is valid on all frames, then we say that it is valid and write ϕ.
Remark 3.4 (Hybrid logic is modal) Hybrid languages contain only familiar modal mechanisms: nominals are atomic formulas, and satisfaction operators are actually normal modal operators (that is: for any nominal
i, @ i (ϕ → ψ) → (@ i ϕ → @ i ψ) is valid;
and if ϕ is valid, then so is @ i ϕ).
Moreover, like multimodal logic, hybrid logic is a fragment of classical logic: indeed, it is easy to extend the Standard Translation to hybrid logic. Divide the first-order variables into two sets such that one contains the reserved variable x and the variables used to translate familiar modalities, while the other contains a first-order variable x i
for every nominal i. Define: 
This corresponds to the following L N wff:
And in fact, AVM notation is essentially a two-dimensional notation for multimodal logic with nominals. For more on feature logic as hybrid logic, see Blackburn [10] , Blackburn and Spaan [17] , and Reape [45, 46] (and see Bird and Blackburn [9] for related ideas in phonology). [22] , Blackburn and Tzakova [19] , Areces and de Rijke [6] , and (in spite of its title) Areces, Blackburn and Marx [3] .
Example 3.8 (Description Logic)
Hybrid Reasoning
Nominals and @ make it possible to create names for states, and to reason about state identity and the way states are linked. This give us enough classical power in the object language to capture the modal locality intuition (recall the little automaton exploring/building graphs) without requiring elaborate metatheoretic proof machinery. Hybrid deduction is a form of labelled deduction -but it's labelled deduction that has been internalized into the object language. I'll formulate hybrid reasoning as an unsigned tableau system. We'll need two groups of rules. Here's the first:
¬@ a ϕ
In these rules, s and t are metavariables over nominals, and a is a metavariable over new nominals (that is, nominals not used so far in the tableau construction). The rules for ∨ and → are obvious variants of the rules for ∧ (we'll see both rules when we give some examples). As with any tableau system, we prove formulas by systematically trying to falsify them. Suppose we want to prove ϕ. We choose a nominal (say i) that does not occur in ϕ (this acts as a name for the falsifying state that is supposed to exist), 
Remark 4.5 (There are other approaches) I have presented hybrid reasoning as an unsigned tableau system, but we are not forced to do this, and the underlying graph construction intuition come through in a range of proof styles. For example, Seligman [52] presents sequent and natural deduction systems with much the same geometrical flavor (indeed Seligman motivates his rules by discussing what a logic of spatial locations should look like). The same is true of Tzakova's [55] Fitting-style indexed tableau approach, Demri's [23] sequent system for the F and P language enriched with nominals but without @, and Konikowska's [36] sequent based approach to the logic of relative similarity.
One last point. The link with orthodox modal labelled deduction should now be clear -but there is also a link with description logic: hybrid reasoning is a form of ABox reasoning. The tableau system manipulates satisfaction statements, which are essentially ABox specifications (recall Example 3.8).
Other Frame Classes
The tableau system is (sound and) complete in the following sense. Let us say that a formula ϕ is tableau provable iff there is a closed tableau with ¬@ i ϕ as its root (where i is a nominal not occurring in ϕ). Then:
Theorem 5.1 ϕ is tableau provable iff ϕ is valid.
Proof. Soundness is straightforward. A completeness proof for unimodal languages is given in Blackburn [13] using a Hintikka set argument; it extends straightforwardly to multimodal languages.
So far so good -but valid means "true in all states in any hybrid model based on any frame", and often we only care about models based on frames with certain properties, and we want to reason in the stronger logics such frames give rise to.
In many cases hybrid reasoning adapts straightforwardly to cope with such demands. In particular, if we use pure formulas (that is, formulas containing no propositional variables) there is a straightforward link between defining a class of frames and reasoning about the frames in that class. A formula ϕ defines a class of frames F iff ϕ is valid on all the frames in F and falsifiable on any frame not in F. A formula defines a property of frames (such as transitivity) iff it defines the class of frames with that property. So: what can pure formulas define? Example 5.2 (Pure formulas and frame definability) Consider the temporal language in F and P . Using pure formulas, we can define a number of properties relevant to temporal logic:
The properties just listed only tell us about R F -but a far more basic property of frames is needed for temporal logic, namely that R F and R P be mutually converse relations. This can also be defined using pure formulas. First note that the following relations between R F and R P are definable:
It follows that the conjunction @ i [F] P i ∧ @ i [P] F i defines those frames in which R F and R P are mutually converse. And once we have this fundamental interaction defined, we can stop thinking in terms of separate R F and R P relations, instead viewing F as looking forward along some binary relation < (the "flow of time") and P as looking backwards along the same relation. This enables us to define further temporally interesting properties:
P F i ∀xy∃z(z < x ∧ z < y) (Left-Directedness) @ i ( F → F [P][P]
¬i) ∀xy(x< y →∃z(x< z ∧ ¬∃w(x< w < z))) (Right-Discreteness) I mentioned in Example 2.1 that asymmetry was not definable in ordinary temporal logic. In fact, with the exception of the mutually converse property, transitivity, and density, none of the properties just defined are definable in orthodox temporal logic. Hybrid languages fill a genuine expressive gap when it comes to defining frames.
Remark 5.3 (All we need are satisfaction statements) Note that if a formula ϕ defines a class of frames F, then so does the satisfaction statement @ i ϕ, where i is any nominal not occurring in ϕ. The relevance of this for tableaux will soon be clear.
So nominals and @ enable us to define interesting classes of frames, and moreover every definable class of frames is definable using a satisfaction statement. This is pleasant -but the really important point is the way these frame defining powers interact with hybrid reasoning. Roughly speaking, if a pure formula α defines a class of frames F, and we are free to introduce α as an axiom into our tableau proofs, then the axiom-enriched tableaux system is guaranteed to be complete with respect to F. For pure formulas, definability and completeness match perfectly.
More precisely, let A be a countable set of pure satisfaction statements, and H+A be the tableau system that uses the formulas in A as axioms. That is, for any α in A, and any nominals j, j 1 , . . . , j n that occur on a branch of a tableau, we are free to add α or α[j 1 /i 1 , . . . , j n /i n ] to the end of that branch (here i 1 . . . , i n are nominals in α, and α[j 1 /i 1 , . . . , j n /i n ] is the pure satisfaction statement obtained by uniformly substituting nominals for nominals as indicated).
Theorem 5.4
Let A be a finite or countably infinite set of pure satisfaction statements, and let F be the class of frames that A defines (that is, the class of frames on which every formula in A is valid). Then H+A is complete with respect to F.
Proof. See Blackburn [13] for the unimodal case. The multimodal case is a straightforward generalization. 
Once again, it is best to think of this proof in terms of a little graph-building automaton: it stepwise generates a graph and shows (now with the help of the axioms) that there is no coherent way to decorate the resulting structure with information.
In effect, Theorem 5.4 tells us that we can analyze hybrid reasoning in terms of a basic proof engine (such as our tableau rules) together with an axiomatic theory (at least so long as the axiomatic theory is formulated using only pure formulas). This is the way things work in first-order logic, and the resemblance is not coincidental. First, recall that the Standard Translation for hybrid languages maps nominals to free firstorder variables. It follows that any pure formula ϕ defines a first-order class of frames (namely the class defined by the universal closure of ST (ϕ)). Second, analogous theorems have been proved for various hybrid languages, and although the completeness proofs differ in many respects, they typically have one ingredient in common: they use nominals to integrate the standard first-order model construction technique (the use of Henkin constants) with the standard modal technique (canonical models). As a number of authors emphasize (in particular Bull [21] , Passy and Tinchev [41] , and Blackburn and Tzakova [20] ), such proofs show that hybrid logic genuinely blends modal and classical ideas.
Remark 5.6 (Related work) Many of the same technical themes (including an essentially identical model construction technique) can be found in Basin, Matthews, and Vigano's [7] approach to labelled deduction for orthodox modal languages. The links between their work and the hybrid tradition deserves further exploration (for a start, many of their proof-theoretical insights may generalize to hybrid languages). Other general completeness results covering first-order definable frame classes have been proved for hybrid languages, such as Demri's [23] extension of the modal Sahlqvist theorem for his nominal-driven temporal sequent system.
But the emphasis on first-order aspects of hybrid logic also point to the limitations of the previous theorem: it doesn't cover second-order frame classes -and many such classes are definable with the aid of propositional variables.
Example 5.7 (Second-order frame classes) By making use of mixed formulas (that is, formulas containing both nominals and ordinary propositional variables) we can define , the integers in their usual order, up to isomorphism; this cannot be done in first-order logic.
The key observation is due to van Benthem [8] , who points out that the simple F and P language can almost define . As he notes, the formula
(a bidirectional variant of the Löb formula used in modal provability logic) defines up to isomorphism on the class of strict total orders without endpoints (that is, this Löb variant is valid on a frame (T, <) that is a strict total order without endpoints iff (T, <) is isomorphic to .)
But it follows from standard modal results that we can't define strict total order without endpoints using only propositional variables -and this is where nominals come to the rescue. We have already seen that there are (pure) formulas defining the mutual converse property of F and P , transitivity, irreflexivity and trichotomy. Furthermore, the formulas F and P ensure that there are no endpoints. So the conjunction of all these (pure) formulas defines the class of strict total orders without endpoints -and hence conjoining the Löb variant yields a (mixed) formula valid on precisely the frames isomorphic to . In a similar way, using a mixed formula it is possible to define AE, the naturals in their usual order, up to isomorphism; see Blackburn [11] for details. The second-order aspects of hybrid languages deserve further study.
The result has another limitation: it gives no computational information. While the basic satisfaction problem for hybrid languages is PSPACE-complete, adding further axioms can have a wide range of effects: they may lower the problem into NP, leave it in PSPACE or lift it to EXPTIME (see Areces, Blackburn and Marx [3] for examples of all three possibilities). Nor is it difficult to devise axioms which result in logics with undecidable satisfaction problems. So the previous result tells us nothing about proof search or termination: it simply draws attention to a group of logic which are well-behaved from the perspective of completeness theory. It may well be that prooftheoretical and computational insights from the labelled deduction and description logic communities have a role to play in analyzing these logics further.
Binding Nominals to States
From the perspective of the Standard Translation, adding nominals to a modal language is in effect to add free variables over states. This immediately suggest a further extension: why not bind these "free variables", thus giving ourselves access to even more expressive power? I'll give a brief sketch of such logics, and then turn to the issue that interests me here: why they are relevant to knowledge representation.
Example 6.1 (Losers, jerks, and politicians) Let's jump into the realms of poppsychology and define a loser to be someone with no self-respect. Now, we can't define this concept in the hybrid logics we have seen so far; the closest we get is:
This says that a specific individual i lacks self-respect. But we want more: we want a formula that is true at precisely those nodes (individuals) which lack a reflexive respect arc. We can get what we want by binding i out:
This sentence is true at precisely those those nodes at which it is possible to bind x to the current state, but impossible to loop back to the current state via the respect relation.
Two remarks. First, the idea of binding nominals to the current state is so important in hybrid logic that a special notation (namely ↓) has been introduced for it. So the previous sentence would normally be written:
Second, as these examples illustrate, orthodox variable notation (x, y, z, and so on) is usually used for bound nominals.
OK -let's now define a jerk to be an idiot who admires himself:
This sentence is satisfied at precisely those nodes which (1) have the idiot property, and (2) from which it is possible to take a reflexive step via the admires relation. Finally, let's define a politician as a smooth talker such that everyone he talks to mistrusts him: ↓ x.(smooth-talker ∧ ∀y( talks-to y → ¬@ y trusts x).
Note the way the @ y switches the perspective from the node x (the politician) to his audience.
I won't give a precise definition of the syntax and semantics of hybrid languages with ∀ and ∃ here (you can find all this in Blackburn and Seligman [15, 16] or Blackburn and Tzakova [18, 19] ). The previous examples tell you pretty much everything you need to know, and the discussion that follows should clarify things further.
Remark 6.2 (We now have first-order expressivity) Our new hybrid logic is strong enough to express any first-order concept. Here's the Hybrid Translation from firstorder representations to our new hybrid logic:
But although we can jump straight up to full first-order power, we don't have to. For a start, the use of @ in the hybrid translation is crucial . If we work with the @-free sublanguage, binding nominals to states with ∃ and ∀ does not yield full firstorder expressive power; for a counterexample, see Proposition 4.5 of Blackburn and Seligman [15] . Hybrid logic decomposes the action of the classical quantifiers into two subtasks: perspective-shifting (performed by @) and binding (performed by the hybrid binders ∃ and ∀).
Moreover, we've seen that there is a useful restricted form of these binders, namely ↓. Some recent papers have explored hybrid logics with a primitive ↓ binder (without ∃ or ∀), and it turns out that such logics characterize the notion of locality; see Areces, Blackburn, and Marx [4] .
Remark 6.3 (But even local binding is complex)
Be warned: ↓ may seem simple, but it's not. Even without @ (let alone ∀ or ∃, which are obviously powerful) it has an undecidable satisfaction problem. A detailed analysis is given in Areces, Blackburn, and Marx [5] .
Why is this? The following result (taken from Blackburn and Seligman [15] ) may help the reader see why local binding is so powerful. We'll see -using a spypoint argument -that a hybrid language containing ↓ and just a single diamond lacks the finite model property. Let SCID4 be the conjunction of the following formulas: [54] and Shoham [53] Why is the methodology pioneered by Allen so popular? In my view, the point is the following. Knowledge representation is ultimately about representing information in a usable form -and this means bringing a variety of information types into a precise framework in which it can be manipulated as flexibly as possible. In essence, Allen's strategy is to start with first-order logic (because it's well understood) and then to mould it to the requirements of knowledge representation. Heavy use of reification and metapredicates allows general statements about a wide range of category types to be made. Logical functions are an attempt to soften the rigid distinction firstorder logic draws between terms (which code referential information) and formulas (which code other types of information), thereby making more flexible representations possible. It's an interesting strategy -but it's not the only one.
Why not start with the intuition that all types of information should be treated democratically -or more accurately, polymorphically? This is the intuition behind hybrid logic. Hybrid logic begins with the observation that we can freely combine referential and non-referential information if we represent both types of information as formulas. Because this is our starting point, we don't need to introduce special logical functions and axioms to govern them -there is no term/formula distinction: the standard connectives are responsible for combining all information right from the start. (Note that @ i (p ∧ q) ↔ @ i p ∧ @ i q, the hybrid analog of Allen's axiom for the and function, isn't something extra that needs to be stipulated: it's just a validity of hybrid logic, and can easily be proved in the basic tableau system.) Nor is there any mystery about what "property terms" are: Allen seems to have wanted properties to have a formula-like structure, and of course, that's exactly the form all representations take in hybrid logic. And binding nominals with ∀ and ∃ (which seems to correspond to Allen's intentions regarding the logical functions exists and all ) will take us all the way up to first-order expressivity (if that's where we want to go).
The Sorting Strategy
In horticulture, hybrids are crossbreeds between distinct but related strains: ideally they combine the desirable properties of the parent strains in interesting new ways. Hybrid logic is certainly hybrid in this sense. Enriching modal logic with nominals and @ leads to systems that draw on both modal and first-order logic: we retain the locality and decidability of modal logic, gain the ability to name states and reason about their identity and their interrelationships, and (via nominal binding) open a novel route to first-order expressivity.
But hybrid logic is also a sociological hybrid: it's a meeting place for ideas from many traditions. We've seen that feature logic, description logic, and labelled deduction have independently developed key ideas of hybrid logic, and I've argued that the Allen-style ontological engineering languages can be viewed as strong hybrid languages. In short, a number of research communities, faced with similar problems (how best to represent and reason about graphlike structures) have come up with similar answers independently. Not only do they draw (consciously or unconsciously) on modal logic, they even moved beyond the barriers of modal orthodoxy in much the same way -the way encapsulated in hybrid logic.
But there is a third sense in which hybrid languages are hybrid, and this is perhaps the most important of all: hybrid languages are intrinsically hybrid. They allow us combine different sorts of information in a single formalism. In a nutshell, hybrid logics are sorted modal logics.
The importance of sorting has long been recognized in AI, linguistics, and philosophy: knowing that a piece of information is of a particular kind may allow us to draw useful conclusions swiftly and easily. But sorting has been neglected in the logical tradition: many useful kinds of sortal reasoning (for example, chaining through an inheritance hierarchy) are regarded as too simple to be of logical interest, and every logician knows that sorted first-order languages offer no new expressive power.
But sorted modal languages certainly do. As we have seen, by adding a second sort of atomic formula (nominals) and a new construct to exploit it (satisfaction operators), we can describe models in more detail and define new classes of frames. Moreover, we can create a basic reasoning system that is modally natural and supports a wide range of richer logics. But the hybrid languages of this paper have been simple two-sorted systems. Why stop there? Example 7.1 (Sorting and fine-grained temporal reference) Blackburn [12] 
Here ρ is a bound path nominal, and x a bound nominal, so this says that on every path ρ through the current state, there is some future state x at which ϕ is true. See Goranko [32] and Blackburn and Tzakova [20] for more on hybrid languages for paths.
I believe such examples point the way to an interesting line of work: dealing with all ontological distinctions in multisorted modal languages. At present little is known about what can and cannot be done in such systems, but interesting questions abound. I hope some equally interesting answers will soon be forthcoming.
A Brief Guide to the Literature
I have said little about the history of hybrid logic; these notes are an attempt to put this right, and provide a route into the hybrid literature. I'll omit references to applications of hybrid logic (such as feature logic) as these were given in the main text.
Hybrid logic was invented by Arthur Prior, the inventor of F and P based temporal logic (that is, tense logic). The germs of the idea seem to have emerged in discussion with C.A. Meredith in the 1950s, but the first detailed account is in Chapter V and Appendix B3 of Prior's 1967 book Past, Present, and Future [42] . Several of the papers collected in Paper on Time and Tense [43] allude to or discuss hybrid languages, and the posthumously published book Worlds, Times and Selves [44] is solely devoted to the topic (unfortunately, the book is only an approximation to Prior's intentions: it's essentially a reconstruction, by Kit Fine, of notes found after Prior's death in 1969). Prior called nominals world propositions, typically worked with very rich hybrid languages (he bound nominals using ∀ and ∃) and made heavy use of near-atomic satisfaction statements like the ones used in our tableau systems.
The next big step was Robert Bull's 1970 paper "An Approach to Tense Logic" [21] . Bull introduced a three-sorted hybrid language (propositional variables, nominals, and path nominals), noted that the presence of ∀ and ∃ made it easy to combine the modal canonical model construction with the first-order Henkin construction (and thus proved the earliest version of Theorem 5.4), and re-thought modal and hybrid completeness theory in terms of Robinson's non-standard set theory. It's a (too long overlooked) classic. Tough going in places, it repays careful reading.
I know of no more papers on the subject till the 1980s, when hybrid logic was independently reinvented by a group of Bulgarian logicians (Solomon Passy, Tinko Tinchev, George Gargov, and Valentin Goranko). The locus classicus of this work is Passy and Tinchev's "An Essay on Combinatoric Dynamic Logic" [41] , a detailed study of hybrid Propositional Dynamic Logic. Like Bull's paper, it's one of the must reads of the hybrid literature (but don't overlook the many other excellent papers by these authors, such as [40, 40, 30, 28, 29] .) The Sofia School did discuss nominal binding with ∀ and ∃, but one of their enduring legacies is that they initiated the study of binder-free systems. Gargov and Goranko's "Modal Logic with Names" [27] studies such systems in the setting of unimodal logic, and my own "Nominal Tense Logic" [11] does so in tense logic.
During the 1990s, the emphasis has been on understanding the hybrid hierarchy in more detail. Goranko [31] introduced ↓, Blackburn and Seligman [15, 16] examined the interrelationships between a number of different binders, and Blackburn and Tzakova [18, 20] mapped hybrid completeness theory for many of these systems. Intuitions about locality hinted at in some of these papers are placed on a firm mathematical footing in Areces, Blackburn and Marx [4] ; the paper also proves some fundamental interpolation and complexity results (see also [5] , by the same authors, for a detailed discussion of undecidability in ↓ based logics). The late 1990's also saw a number of papers of hybrid proof theory: Blackburn [13] , Demri [23] , Demri and Goré [24] , Konikowska [36] , Seligman [52] and Tzakova [55] . Actually, pioneering work had been done by Seligman at the beginning of the decade (see [50, 51] ); unfortunately his work was overlooked.
Here's three suggestions for further reading. First, Chapter 7 of Blackburn, de Rijke, and Venema [14] contains a textbook level discussion on how to blend the canonical model and Henkin constructions (the idea behind Theorem 5.4 and its analogs). Second, "Complexity Results for Hybrid Temporal Logics" [3] a recent paper by Areces, Blackburn and Marx studies complexity issues in some detail. The proofs make heavy use of relational structures and have a strong geometric content. The paper relates the results to issues in temporal (and, in spite of the title, description) logic; for many readers this would be a good place to learn more about the expressivity hybrid languages offer. Third, Marx [38] is a review of HyLo'99 (the First International Workshop on Hybrid Logic). This will give you a birds-eye-view of current issues in the field. In addition, Carlos Areces has recently created a hybrid logic website at http://www.illc.uva.nl/~carlos/hybrid. You can find the papers just mentioned (and others) there.
